Part One: Advertising as Social Production

Consumptionism is the name given to the new doctrine; and it is admitted today to be the greatest idea that America has to give to the world; the idea that workmen and masses be looked upon not simply as workers and producers, but as consumers. . . . Pay them more, sell them more, prosper more is the equation.
— MRS. CHRISTINE FREDERICK, Selling Mrs. Consumer (1929)

CHAPTER ONE
“Shorter hours, higher wages . . .”

In 1910, Henry Ford instituted the “line production system” for “maximum production economy” in his Highland Park, Michigan, plant. The innovation, though in many ways unsophisticated, and hardly educated as to its own implications, was the beginning of a momentous transformation in America’s capacity to produce. In quantitative terms, the change was staggering. On the 1910 line, the time required to assemble a chassis was twelve hours and twenty-eight minutes. “By spring of 1914, the Highland Park plant was turning out over 1,000 vehicles a day, and the average labor time for assembling a chassis had dropped to one hour and thirty-three minutes.”

Mass production was a way of making production more economical. Through his use of the assembly line, Ford was able to utilize “expensive, single-purpose” machinery along with “quickly trained, single-purpose” workmen to make a single-model, inexpensive automobile at a rate which, with increasing sophistication, continued to dwarf not only the production levels of premassified industry, but the output of less refined mass production systems.

By the 1920’s, interest in and employment of the industrial potential of mass production extended far beyond the automobile industry. In recognition of such industrial developments, the United States Special Census of 1921 and 1923 offered a study of productive capacity which was one of the first general discussions of its kind. Consumer goods manufacturers were coming to recognize that mass production and mass distribution were “necessary” steps toward survival in a competitive market. Edward Filene, of the Boston department store family, a businessman founder of the consumer union movement, articulated the competitive compulsion of mass production. Competition, said Filene, “will compel us to Fordize American business and industry.”

And yet, what Filene and others meant by “Fordizing” American industry transcended the myopic vision of Henry Ford. While Ford stubbornly held to the notion that “the work and the work alone controls US,” others in the automobile industry and, (for our purposes) more importantly, ideologues of mass industry outside of the auto industry viewed the strategy of production in far broader social terms. Before mass production, industry had produced for a limited, largely middle- and upper-class market. With a burgeoning productive capacity, industry now required an
The mechanism of mass production could not function unless markets became more dynamic, growing horizontally (nationally), vertically (into social classes not previously among the consumers) and ideologically. Now men and women had to be habituated to respond to the demands of the productive machinery. The corollary to a freely growing system of goods production was a “systematic, nationwide plan . . . to endow the masses with more buying power,” a freely growing system of consumer production. The modern mass producer could not depend upon an elite market to respond to his productive capacity. From a dependence upon local markets or localized markets scattered nationally, the manufacturer was forced to “count on the whole United States if he [was] . . . going to manufacture a large enough quantity of goods to reduce the cost to the point where he [could] . . . compete with other manufacturers of the same goods” and subsequently distribute his mass produced wares more efficiently and profitably. He was required to create an ideological bridge across traditional social gaps — region, taste, need and class — which would narrow prejudices in his favor.

Considering the quantitative possibilities of mass production, the question of “national markets” became one of qualitatively changing the nature of the American buying public. In response to the exigencies of the productive system of the twentieth century, excessiveness replaced thrift as a social value. It became imperative to invest the laborer with a financial power and a psychic desire to consume.

By the end of the depression of 1921, “productive machinery was so effective that even more so than before much greater markets were absolutely necessary than those provided by the existing public buying power.” As the question of expanding old and creating new markets became a function of the massification of industry, foresighted businessmen began to see the necessity of organizing their businesses not merely around the production of goods, but around the creation of a buying public. “The changes that we shall be obliged to make in production,” noted Filene, “will lead to pretty thorough overhauling of our machinery and methods of distribution, and, in the end, both the quantity and quality of consumption will be dictated by them.” As the “twentieth-century industrialist... realized to a greater extent than did his predecessors, that he must understand the living world contained by his factory,” so too did he realize that he must understand and manipulate, as part of his productive apparatus, the total world occupied by his workers. The necessity to “influence human conduct,” the knowledge that goods production meant social production, encoded within the rhetoric of some businessmen a revealing idiom; “human conduct” or the “consumer’s dollar” became equivalent to industrial discoveries, more valuable to manufacturing “than the uses of electricity or steel.” Within an ideal of a “scientifically” managed, industry, raw materials and consumers were both viewed as malleable. They both would have to be shaped by the demands of the production line, pecuniary interests, and the newly emergent managerial tools of capital.

As capitalism became characterized by mass production and the subsequent need for mass distribution, traditional expedients for the real or attempted manipulation of labor were transformed. While the nineteenth-century industrialist coerced labor (both on and off the job) to serve as the “wheelhorse” of industry, modernizing capitalism sought to change “wheelhorse” to “worker” and “worker” to “consumer.”

For the workers, the movement toward mass production had severely changed the character of labor. The worker had become a decreasingly “significant” unit of production within the modern manufacturing process. “The man who had been the more or less creative maker of the whole of an article became the tender of a machine that made only one small part of the article.” The time
required to teach the worker the “adept performance” of his “operation on assembly work” was a matter of a few hours. This development had significant repercussions both in terms of the way in which a laborer viewed his proletarian status and in terms of the manufacturer’s need to mass distribute the mountainous fruits of mass production. The two phenomena merged in the redefinition of the proletarian status. While mass production defined labor’s work in terms of monotony and rationalized its product to a fragment, some businessmen spoke of “economic freedom” or “industrial democracy” as the blessing promised the worker by modern production methods. Yet the “freedom” and “democracy” offered by mass industry stopped short of a freedom to define the uses or to rearrange the relationships of production. “The industrial democracy I am discussing,” Filene assured those who might fear its anticapitalist implications, “has nothing to do with the Cubist politics of class revolution.” What was meant, rather, was that modern industrial production required that workers be free to “cultivate themselves” among the uncontestable fruits of the new industrial cornucopia.

The endowment of the masses with “industrial democracy” was seen as a complex and involving process. Their traditional role in capitalism had afforded them neither the cash nor the conviction to be so “democratized.” It was imperative that the worker “desire a larger share in the mental and spiritual satisfactions of the property of his daily job much more than . . . a larger share in the management of the enterprise which furnishes that job.”

Not only was this alleged democracy designed to define the modern worker as a smoothly running unit of industrial production, it also tended to define protest and proletarian unrest in terms of the desire to consume, making these profitable as well. By the demand of workers for the right to be better consumers, the aspirations of labor would be profitably coordinated with the aspirations of capital. Such convictions implicitly attempted to divest protest of its anticapitalist content. Modern labor protest should have no basis in class antagonism.

By the twenties, the ideological vanguard of the business community saw the need to endow the masses with what the economic historian Norman Ware has called the money, commodity, and psychic wages (satisfactions) correlative and responsive to the route of industrial capitalism. There was a dramatic movement toward objective conditions which would make mass consumption feasible: higher wages and shorter hours. Giving official sanction to such visions, Herbert Hoover noted that “High wages [are the] . . . very essence of great production.” In 1923, Julius Barnes, president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, spoke of the need to prevent the overconcentration of wealth, which threatened the development of a “broad purchasing market necessary to absorb our production.” Certainly the movement to higher wages preceded the twenties, but it is mainly in the twenties that this movement became linked to a general strategy to consumerize the worker. As early as 1914, Henry Ford had instituted the five-dollar work-day wage, but his innovation coexisted with a nineteenth-century Protestant value system which the worker was expected to maintain. This system significantly clashed with the “economic freedom” that, out of necessity, attempted to subvert the moderation earlier valued for the masses.

The question of shorter hours was also tantamount to offering labor the “chance” to expand the consumer market. And yet, this notion of “chance” like the notions of “industrial democracy” and “economic freedom,” were subterfuges in so much as these alleged freedoms and choices meant merely a transformed version of capitalism’s incessant need to mold a work force in its own image. “As modern industry . . . [was] geared to mass production, time out for mass consumption becomes as much a necessity as time in for production.” The shortening of hours was seen as a qualitative as well as quantitative change in the worker’s life, without significantly altering his relation to power over the uses and means of production. In addition to increasing the amount of leisure, it was hoped that shorter hours would productively determine “to some extent, the use of leisure and consumption . . . ” Shorter hours and higher wages were seen as a first step in a
broader offensive against notions of thrift and an attempt to habituate a national population to the exigencies of mass production. A capitalism that had previously required the worker to “live, move, and . . . [have] . . . his being there on the job” was now, in some industries, trying to undo such notions. Now priorities demanded that the worker spend his wages and leisure time on the consumer market. Realizing that earlier conditions had not been “favorable to such a worker’s finding in, say, the sector of his home the sought-for satisfactions of forward movement and distinction,” Whiting Williams, personnel director for a steel company and an ideologue of “scientific” management, felt that labor had developed a “suspicion” of such “sought for satisfactions.” Once again linking the rhetoric of freedom to the necessities of capitalism, Filene noted that,

modern workmen have learned their habits of consumption and their habits of spending (thrift) in the school of fatigue, in a time when high prices and relatively low wages have made it necessary to spend all the energies of the body and mind in providing food, clothing and shelter. We have no right to be overcritical of the way they spend a new freedom or a new prosperity until they have had as long a training in the school of freedom. Within the vision of consumption as a “school of freedom,” the entry onto the consumer market was described as a “civilizing” experience. “Civilization” was the expanded cultural world which flowed from capitalism’s broad capacity to commodify material resources. The experience of civilization was the cultural world this capacity produced.

And yet the “school of freedom” posed various problems. The democratic terminology within which the profitable vision of consumption was posed did not reveal the social and economic realities that threatened that vision. In terms of economic development, the financial growth of industrial corporations averaged 286 percent between 1922 and 1929. Despite wage hikes and relatively shorter hours in some industries, the average manufacturing wage-earner showed a wage increase of only 14 percent during this same period. The discrepancy between purchasing power and the rate of industrial growth was dealt with in part by the significant development of installment selling which grew as an attempt to bolster “inadequate” markets in the economically depressed years of the early twenties. Despite the initiation of a corporate credit system which offered consumers supplementary money, the growth of the productive system forced many industrial ideologues to realize the continuous need to habituate people psychically to consumption beyond mere changes in the productive order which they inhabited.

**CHAPTER TWO**

*Mobilizing the Instincts*

The man with the proper imagination is able to conceive of any commodity in such a way that it becomes an object of emotion to him and to those to whom he imparts his picture, and hence creates desire rather than a mere feeling of ought.

— WALTER DILL SCOTT, *Influencing Men in Business* (1911)

Modern advertising must be seen as a direct response to the needs of mass industrial capitalism. Second in procession after the manager of the production line, noted Whiting Williams, “came the leader who possessed the ability to develop and direct men’s desires and demands in a way to furnish the organized mass sales required for the mass production made possible by the massed
Advertising, as a part of mass distribution within modernizing industries, became a major sector for business investment. Within the automobile industry, initiated by the broad and highly diversified G. M. oligopoly, distribution came to account for about one half of that investment. Among producers of smaller consumer goods, the percentage of capital devoted to product proliferation was often greater.

In the 1920s, advertising played a role of growing significance in industry’s attempt to develop a continually responsive consumer market. Although committed national corporations saw advertising as an invaluable component of critical economic planning, its acceptance was hardly universal. In its early days the mass advertising industry that developed in concert with the mass needs of industrial corporations continually had to sell itself to industry. Between 1918 and 1923, a greater percentage of articles in the advertising trade journal Printers’ Ink, were devoted to ways of convincing “ancient” corporations that advertising was a given of modern industrialism than were devoted to advertising and merchandising techniques. During the 1920s, however, advertising grew to the dimensions of a major industry. In 1918, total gross advertising revenues in general and farm magazines was $58.5 million. By 1920 the gross had reached $129.5 million; and by 1929, $196.3 million. Such figures do not include newspaper revenues or, more significantly, direct-to-buyer advertising, which still comprised a major, though declining, sector of the industry.

In an address to the American Association of Advertising Agencies on October 27, 1926, Calvin Coolidge noted that the industry now required “for its maintenance, investments of great capital, the occupation of large areas of floor space, the employment of an enormous number of people.”

The production line had insured the efficient creation of vast quantities of consumer goods; now ad men spoke of their product as “business insurance” for profitable and efficient distribution of these goods. While line management tended to the process of goods production, social management (advertisers) hoped to make the cultural milieu of capitalism as efficient as line management had made production. Their task was couched in terms of a secular religion for which the advertisers sought adherents. Calvin Coolidge, applauding this new clericism, noted that “advertising ministers to the spiritual side of trade.”

Advertising offered itself as a means of efficiently creating consumers and as a way of homogeneously “controlling the consumption of a product.” Although many corporations boasted of having attained national markets without the aid of advertising, the trade journal Printers’ Ink argued that these “phantom national markets” were actually inefficient, unpredictable and scattered agglomerations of heterogeneous local markets. The significance of the notion of efficiency in the creation of consumers lies in the fact that the modern advertising industry, like the modern manufacturing plant, was an agent of consolidated and multi-leveled commerce. As Ford’s assembly line utilized “expensive single-purpose machinery” to produce automobiles inexpensively and at a rate that dwarfed traditional methods, the costly machinery of advertising that Coolidge had described set out to produce consumers, likewise inexpensively and at a rate that dwarfed traditional methods. To create consumers efficiently the advertising industry had to develop universal notions of what makes people respond, going beyond the “horse sense” psychology that had characterized the earlier industry. Such general conceptions of human instinct promised to provide ways of reaching a mass audience via a universal appeal. Considering the task of having to build a mass ad industry to attend to the needs of mass production, the ad men welcomed the work of psychologists in the articulation of these general conceptions.

The vanguard of the business community found the social psychology of such men as Floyd Henry Allport extremely useful in giving an ideological cohesion to much of what one sees in the advertising of the twenties. Explicating his notion of the way in which man develops a sense of himself from infancy, Allport asserted that “our consciousness of ourselves is largely a reflection
of the consciousness which others have of us. . . . My idea of myself is rather my own idea of my neighbor’s view of me.”

47 This notion of the individual as the object of continual and harsh social scrutiny underscored the argument of much of the ad texts of the decade.

Whether or not the general conception of “self” as propounded by Floyd Henry Allport had a direct bearing on the Weltanschauung held by advertising in the 1920s is not clear. It was generally conceded, however, that a “knowledge of people — human nature” was as necessary a constituent of social production as the line manager’s knowledge of his raw materials was to goods production.

While agreeing that “human nature is more difficult to control than material nature,” ad men spoke in specific terms of “human instincts” which if properly understood could induce people “to buy a given product if it was scientifically presented. If advertising copy appealed to the right instincts, the urge to buy would surely be excited.” The utilitarian value of a product or the traditional notion of mechanical quality were no longer sufficient inducements to move merchandise at the necessary rate and volume required by mass production.

Such traditional appeals would not change the disposition of potential markets toward consumption of given products. Instead each product would be offered in isolation, not in terms of the nature of the consumer, but through an argument based on the intrinsic qualities of the item itself.

The advertisers were concerned with effecting a self-conscious change in the psychic economy, which could not come about if they spent all their time talking about a product and none talking about the “reader.” Advertising literature, following the advent of mass production methods, increasingly spoke in terms of appeals to instinct. Anticipating later implementation, by 1911, Walter Dill Scott, psychologist/author of Influencing Men in Business, noted that “goods offered as means of gaining social prestige make their appeals to one of the most profound of the human instincts.”

Yet the instinct for “social prestige,” as well as others of a broad “constellation” of instincts, was channeled into the terms of the productive system. The use value of “prestige,” of “beauty,” of “acquisition,” of “self-adornment,” and of “play” were all placed in the service of advertising’s basic purpose — to provide effective mass distribution of products. Carl A. Naether, an advocate of advertising for women, demonstrated how the link might be effected between “instinct” and mass sales.

An attractive girl admiring a string of costly pearls just presented to her would in no few cases make the one seeing her in an advertisement exclaim: “I wish that I, too, might have a set of these pearls and so enhance my personal appearance.” Such and similar longings are merely expressions of real or fancied need for what is advertised.

53 The creation of “fancied need” was crucial to the modern advertiser. The transcendence of traditional consumer markets and buying habits required people to buy, not to satisfy their own fundamental needs, but rather to satisfy the real, historic needs of capitalist productive machinery. Advertising was a way of making people put time and energy into what Calvin Coolidge referred to as their “education” to production. The investment of time and energy in deliberation over an advertisement, as described by Scott, enacted in microcosm the commitment of one’s total time and energy to consumption. Advertising demanded but a momentary participation in the logic of consumption. Yet hopefully that moment would be expanded into a life style by its educational value. A given ad asked not only that an individual buy its product, but that he experience a self-conscious perspective that he had previously been socially and psychically denied. By that
perspective, he could ameliorate social and personal frustrations through access to the 
marketplace.

In light of such notions as Allport’s “social self” and other self-objectifying visions of popularity-
and success, a new cultural logic was projected by advertising beyond the strictly pecuniary one 
of creating the desire to consume. The social perception was one in which people ameliorated the 
negative condition of social objectification through consumption — material objectification. The 
negative condition was portrayed as social failure derived from continual public scrutiny. The 
positive goal emanated from one’s modern decision to armor himself against such scrutiny with 
the accumulated “benefits” of industrial production. Social responsibility and social self-
preservation were being correlated to an allegedly existential decision that one made to present a 
mass-produced public face. Man, traditionally seen as exemplary of God’s perfect product, was 
now hardly viable in comparison with the man-made products of industrial expertise. The 
elevation of man’s works in the cosmos which had underlined the half-way covenant among New 
England Puritans was now being secularized into the realm of mass social production. It was felt 
that capitalism, through an appeal to instincts — ultimately feelings of social insecurity — could 
habituate men and women to consumptive life. Such social production of consumers represented 
a shift in social and political priorities which has since characterized much of the “life” of 
American industrial capitalism. The functional goal of national advertising was the creation of 
desires and habits. In tune with the need for mass distribution that accompanied the development 
of mass production capabilities, advertising was trying to produce in readers personal needs which 
would dependently fluctuate with the expanding marketplace.

Exposing an affirmative vision of capitalist production, Calvin Coolidge reassured the members 
of the ad industry in 1926 that “rightfully applied, it [advertising] is the method by which the desire 
is created for better things.” The nature of this desire, and not incidentally the nature of 
capitalism, required an unquestioning attitude toward the uses of production. The use of 
psychological methods, therefore, attempted to turn the consumer’s critical functions away from 
the product and toward himself. The determining factor for buying was self-critical and ideally 
ignored the intrinsic worth of the product. The Lynds, in their study, Middletown, noted that unlike 
ads of a generation before, modern advertising was

    concentrating increasingly upon a type of copy aiming to make the reader 
emotionally uneasy, to bludgeon him with the fact that decent people don’t live 
the way he does. . . . This copy points an accusing finger at the stenographer as 
she reads her motion picture magazine and makes her acutely conscious of her 
unpolished finger nails . . . and sends the housewife peering anxiously into the 
mirror to see if her wrinkles look like those that made Mrs. X in the 
advertisement “old at thirty-five” because she did not have a Leisure Hour 
electric washer. 

Advertising hoped to elicit the “instinctual” anxieties of social intercourse. Cutex Hand 
Preparations made of well-tended hands an armor against failure. Hoping to prepare the psyche for 
such an argument, Cutex advertisements declared in the Ladies’ Home Journal, April 1920:

    You will be amazed to find how many times in one day people glance at your 
nails. At each glance a judgment is made. . . . Indeed some people make a 
practice of basing Their estimate of a new acquaintance largely upon this one 
detail.

Even those whose physical appearances were marketably “safe,” who appeared to be “the picture 
of health,” were warned of the inscrutable perils with which they traveled. Listerine was offered as
an agent to militate against “The Hidden Wells of Poison” that lurk and conspire against the “program[s] of pleasure” of even the most beautiful women.

The Lynds saw advertising “and other channels of increased cultural diffusion from without . . . [as] rapidly changing habits of thought as to what things are essential to living and multiplying optional occasions for spending money.” The critical analysis offered by the Lynds found unwitting support in predominant advertising theory. It was recognized that in order to get people to consume and, more importantly, to keep them consuming, it was more efficient to endow them with a critical self-consciousness in tune with the “solutions” of the marketplace than to fragmentarily argue for products on their own merit. Writing in Printers’ Ink, Frederick P. Anderson spoke of the industry’s conscious attempt to direct man’s critical faculties against himself or his environment, “to make him self-conscious about matter of course things such as enlarged nose pores, bad breath . . . .

In mass advertising, the consciousness of a selling point was precisely the theorized “self-consciousness” of the modern consumer which had occasioned the Lynds’ remarks. This consumer self-consciousness was clearly identifiable with the continuous need for product proliferation that informed modern industry. Linking the theories of “self-consciousness” to the exigencies of capitalism, one writer in Printers’ Ink commented that “advertising helps to keep the masses dissatisfied with their mode of life, discontented with ugly things around them. Satisfied customers are not as profitable as discontented ones.”

NOTES

3 “. . . during a period of eighteen years commencing in 1908, Ford Motor Company manufactured and offered for sale only one basic model of passenger automobile. . . . This was the [black] Model T.” See Chandler, pp. 27, 37.
5 This may be seen as a response to a combination of things. Aside from the fact of proliferating mass production methods, the 1921 depression/buyers’ strike served as an impetus to this study.
7 Chandler, p. 143.
8 Notably Alfred P. Sloan of General Motors. Sloan saw productive strategy in broad social terms. His biography, My Life With General Motors (1960), gives an account of these early developments.
9 Loeb, p. xv, in regard to “the capacity of the nation to produce goods and services. If full advantage were taken of existing resources, man power, and knowledge . . . every new invention, every improved method, every advance in management technique will increase the final quantitative estimate.” Such a question would be answered by “a running inventory of our approach to perfection rather than a research into existing capacity as determined by production.” The survey considered such a potential too open-ended to effect meaningful speculation.
12 Ernest Elmo Calkins, Business the Civilizer (1928), p. 10
By the 1920s widespread elements of the union movement had accepted such an ideology. Among others, William English Walling of the Labor Progressives dissolved the class struggle in one fell swoop. Virtually paraphrasing the ideologues of scientifically planned capitalism, he felt that “to bring labor to the maximum productivity, the American labor movement believes, requires new organization and policies in the administration of industry.” See William Walling, American Labor and American Democracy (1926), p. 233.

Walling spoke of labor and consumer as interrelated aspects of the total life of the American worker. His concern for consumer rights reflected the ideology of progressive capital no less than did the writings of Edward Filene, who, although he had one foot in the “consumer category,” placed his other on the side of financial power rather than in the monotony of factory life.

In an attempt to assure that his workers carried on a “moderate” life off of the job, Ford developed a Sociological Department staffed by thirty investigators who were “empowered to go into the workers’ homes to make sure that no one was drinking too much, that everyone’s sex life was without blemish, that leisure time was profitably spent, that no boarders were taken in, that houses were clean and neat.” Baritz, p. 33.

According to Ware’s studies, union manufacturing labor averaged 40-48 hours per week. Nonunion labor in similar industries averaged 50 hours per week, while labor in more traditional areas, mills and shops, worked 48-60 hours per week.

“In some lines, such as whiskey and milk, distribution cost is from four to ten times the cost of production.” Chandler, p. 157


Calkins, p. 236.

44 Baritz, p. 27.
46 Williams, *Mainsprings*.
48 Calkins, p. 123.

49 Scott, p. 3.
51 Scott, p. 132.
54 “When we stop to consider the part which advertising plays in the modern life of production and trade, we see that basically it is that of education . . . it makes new thoughts, new desires and new actions.” Presbrey, p. 620.
55 Scott, p. 43.
56 “Physical or sex attraction . . . other things being equal, qualities which make one pleasing to look at or to caress render their possessor popular to many and loved by not a few.” Allport, p. 365.
58 Presbrey, p. 622.
62 In “The People as Consumers,” Robert Lynd further characterized the advertising of products of mass technology in terms of the questions of “uniformity” and the nature of the modern capitalist marketplace.
   “Technological uniformity and complexity . . . tends to remove further the complex of characteristics blanketed by a brand name from the sorts of empirical comparisons that were more often possible a generation ago.... There is a ceaseless quest for what advertising men call ‘million dollar ideas’ . . . to disguise commodities still further by identifying them with cryptic characteristics.” *Recent Social Trends*, I, pp. 876-877.